Searching for available parking spaces is a major problem for drivers in big cities, causing traffic congestion and air pollution, and wasting drivers' time. Smart parking systems enable drivers to have real-time parking information for prebooking. However, current smart parking requires drivers to disclose their private information, such as desired destinations. Moreover, the existing schemes are centralized and vulnerable to the bottle neck of the single point of failure and data breaches. In this paper, we propose a distributed privacypreserving smart parking system using blockchain. A consortium blockchain created by different parking lot owners to ensure security, transparency, and availability is proposed to store their parking offers on the blockchain. To preserve drivers' location privacy, we adopt private information retrieval (PIR) technique to enable drivers to retrieve parking offers from blockchain nodes privately, without revealing which parking offers are retrieved. Furthermore, a short randomizable signature is used to enable drivers to reserve available parking slots in anonymous manner. Besides, we introduce anonymous payment system that cannot link drivers' to specific parking locations. Our performance evaluations demonstrate that the proposed scheme can preserves drivers' privacy with low communication and computation overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the fast-growing number of vehicles over the few last years, finding a vacant parking space has become a frustrating problem for drivers in big cities [1] . According to [2] , finding available parking space, leads to an average 30 percentage of traffic congestion. In addition, 47,0000 gallons of gasoline are consumed which produces 728 tons of carbon dioxide on average per year in Los Angeles only [3] . Consequently, this arises to serious problems, such as traffic congestion, air pollution, and wasting drivers' times [4] .
On the other side and due to the advancement in wireless communication and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, Smart Parking system has been emerged as an efficient solution to traditional parking operations by providing online parking reservation services to drivers. In smart parking, an IoT device, in each parking spot, uses an ultrasonic sensor to detect whether a certain parking slot is available or not, providing real time occupancy status of parking spaces to an online service provider. The service provider enables drivers to check the available parking spaces and make online reservations, which facilitates their task to find vacant parking spaces.
Despite the aforementioned benefits of smart parking systems, they impose several challenges that need to be well addressed before deploying them. One major concern is drivers' privacy, since drivers are required to disclose sensitive information, such as real identities, destinations, and reservation times to the service provider. Such sensitive information can allow service providers to infer drivers' daily activities and life patterns such as home/work address, health condition, salary level, diet preference, and even drivers' real identities by analyzing transmitting messages along with background knowledge [5] . Moreover, the existing smart parking schemes are traditional centralized based schemes [6] - [8] which suffer from several limitations. First, they are prone to inherent single point of failure problem [9] . Second, they are vulnerable to DDoS attacks and remote hijacking attacks, which could make the parking services unavailable. Third, and more importantly driver's sensitive information (e.g, name, email address and phone number) and daily parking information are saved in the database of smart parking systems, which has the risk of privacy disclosure and data loss. A very related fresh lesson to us is the tremendous private data leakage of Uber [10] . Therefore, it is desirable to reduce the reliance on a centralized approaches [11] .
In contrast to existing centralized solutions, A promising blockchain technology with advantages of decentralization, security, and trust has attracted the attention of both academia and industry [12] . Blockchain is a distributed, transparent and immutable public ledger organized as a chain of blocks. The blockchain is managed and replicated by a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Each block includes messages committed by the network peers, and is validated by the whole network through a pre-defined consensus protocol [9] . Therefore, with the blockchain in place, multiple untrusted nodes can establish a shared distributed ledger and run applications without a central authority while achieving the same functionality attained through a central authority.
Motivated by this technology, in this paper, we propose a decentralized and privacy preserving smart parking system using Consortium Blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to leverage blockchain technology to provide decentralized smart parking services.
Our main contributions and the challenges this paper addresses are summarized as follows.
• Unlike existing centralized based smart parking systems, a consortium blockchain is established by authorized nodes (i.e., different parking lot owners) that do not trust each other. Parking lot owners send their parking offers include necessary parking information, such as number of available slots, location, prices, and available times. Then, consortium blockchain network will record the parking offers in a distributed shared ledger. • To address the driver's location privacy , we adopt a private information retrieval (PIR) technique for retrieving parking offers privately while revealing no information on which parking offers being requested. Retrieving parking offers using PIR provides accuracy for drivers while selecting parking offers more than the location obfuscation by geo-indistinguishably and cloaking techniques which have been used in [6] , [7] . Since the privacy of the latter techniques is achieved by increasing the obfuscated area, this reduces the accuracy of selecting nearest parking in theses schemes. • After a driver retrieves available parking offers within a specific region, she uses her anonymous credentials generated using short randomizable signature scheme [13] to make a reservation directly with the parking lot owner. The use of short randomizable signature preserves the privacy of drivers where no entity can link if two reservation requests are sent from the same driver. Also, a down payment should be associated with each parking reservation to discourage multiple reservations within a specific time (fake reservations). • Since credit or debit card payments may reveal sensitive information about drivers parking times or even tracking them by linking identities of drivers with these payments, we introduce an anonymous payment to preserve the privacy of the drivers during the payment. • To address anonymity-yet-accountability of drivers, we consider two cases of misbehavior, i.e, making multiple reservations within a specific time without committing these reservations or double spend the anonymous coins. Short randomizable signature scheme provides conditional privacy, so in case of misbehavior, parking lot owners can contact a trusted authority, i.e., governmental agency, which can reveal the identity of misbehaving driver and punish her by revoking her from the system. • We run experiments to evaluate the communication overhead and computational overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The network and threat models are introduced in Section II. Preliminaries and design goals are given in Section III. The proposed schemes are presented in Section IV. Security and Privacy analysis are discussed in Section V. performance evaluations are given in Section V1. The related works are presented in Section VII. Finally, conclusion is drawn in Section VIII. 
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
In this section, we present the considered system model followed by the threat model.
A. System Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the considered system model has the following entities.
blockchain network is made of authorized nodes i.e., parking lot owners. Specifically, it processes and records all parking offers and payments (transactions) on the shared ledger using a pre-defined consensus algorithm [15] . • Parking Lot Owners (POs). POs are owners of parking lots. Each lot includes IoT devices that collect available parking information. POs then can publsih their offers to the blockchain network. The POs can be public or private (e.g., residential parking or employees parking). • Drivers. Drivers can use their smart phones to interact through the system to find available parking spaces and make online parking reservations.
B. Threat Model
We consider that the TA and FI are fully trusted. Also, we follow the standard blockchain threat model in [16] , blockchain in our proposed scheme is maintained by a set of validators/miners, and is trusted for execution correctness, but not for privacy. The consortium blockchain made of group of nodes of parking lot owners. In this model, we assume that at most t nodes may collude during the private retrieval process to infer information about drivers parking desired locations. Also, at most b nodes may return erroneous responses during the return process, which we refer to them as Byzantine nodes. In addition, some portions of drivers can be malicious. For example, they may reserve multiple parking spaces for the same time or double spend the digital coins during the payment process. Finally, an external attacker can eavesdrop the communications in the system to infer drivers' sensitive information to pretend as a legitimate driver (impersonation attack) to get services without registration.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the necessary background on short randomizable signatures and private information retrieval (PIR) and that we use in our paper. The notation used in the paper are listed in Table. I.
A. Bilinear Mapping
Given G 1 and G 2 two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p, where g is the generator of G 1 andg is the generator of G 2 . A bilinear map e is defined as e : G 1 × G 2 − → G T , and should have the following properties: (i) e(g,g) computed efficiently for all g ∈ G 1 ,g ∈ G 2 (ii) bilinear: e(g a ,g b ) = e(g,g) ab , ∀ g ∈ G 1 ,g ∈ G 2 and a, b ∈ Z * q (iii) Nondegenerate: e(g,g) = 1 [17] .
B. Short Randomizable Signatures
The short randomizable signature has been proposed in [13] to provide users' anonymity and conditional privacy. The signature scheme provides efficiency and avoids the linear-size drawback in the traditional signatures. In other words, the size of the signature is independent on the message length. Also, the signature can be used as an anonymous credential where 
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it can be randomized to achieve conditional anonymity. The main scheme consists of the following algorithms:
The TA picks λ as a security input and generates public system parameters p· p ← − (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e). The biliniear groups are type 3. This can be denoted as G * 1 = G 1 \{1 G1 }. Then, It picks a randomg $ ← G 2 , chooses two randoms (x, y) $ ← Z 2 p as a secret key (sk), and computes (X,Ỹ ) $ ← (g x ,g y ) and sets (g,X,Ỹ ) as a public key (pk).
After the group manager (TA) runs the Setup algorithm, it sets the group master public key gmpk as (g,X,Ỹ ) along with generator g ∈ G 1 and sets the group secret key gmsk as (x, y).
A user i generates (usk i , upk i ) and sends upk i to a certificate authority. Then, she can join the group by starting an interactive protocol with the group manager. She randomly generates a secret sk i $ ← Z p and sends (γ,γ)
The group manager verifies the signature η by testing e(γ,Ỹ ) ? = e(g,γ). Next, the user will invoke interactive Schnorr's protocol to prove the knowledge of sk i [18] . If the proof is valid, the group manager randomly generates u $ ← Z p and computes a signature σ←(σ 1 , σ 2 )←(g u , (g x · (γ) y ) u ) on sk i . After that, the group manager stores (i, γ, η,γ) in its tracking list and sends the signature σ to the user who sets (sk i , σ 1 , σ 2 , e(σ 1 ,Ỹ )) as gsk i .
For a user to sign a message m, she selects a random r and randomizes the signature σ by computing (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ←(σ r 1 , σ r 2 ) . Then, she computes a signature of knowledge for sk i as follows: (i) she randomly selects k $ ← Z p and computes e(σ 1 ,Ỹ ) k·r , and computes a hash function c ← H(σ 1 , σ 2 , e(σ 1 ,Ỹ ) k·r , m)
Given a signature µ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , c, s) on a message m, the verifier calculates V ←(e(σ −1 1 ,X),e(σ 2 ,g)) −c ,e(σ s 1 ,Ỹ ) and checks c
The group manager can open a signature µ by checking e(σ 2 ,g) · e(σ 1 ,X) = e(σ 1 ,γ) for all entries (i, γ, η,γ) in its tracking list. Once a match is found by the group manager, it outputs (i, γ i , η i ) with a proof of knowledge ofγ i .
C. Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
The Private Information Retrieval (PIR) technique enables a user to retrieve or download a specific data (file) from a storage system without revealing any information about the identity of the file being requested. This fits our model as every driver (user in PIR) needs to query the blockchain (distributed databases in PIR) for parking offers within certain cell without revealing the driver's interest in specific parking offer (i.e., the identity of the parking offer).
In this work, we adopt the PIR scheme in [19] . This scheme is an information-theoretic PIR scheme for retrieving data from MDS-coded, colluding, unresponsive, and Byzantine databases. The reason we use this scheme instead the capacity achieving scheme in [20] is to avoid the exponential file size (in the number of parking offers), which is needed to realize the scheme. Furthermore, as the number of parking offers become sufficiently large, the retrieval rate of [19] converges to the capacity expression of [20] .
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME.
A. System Initialization
In the system initialization phase, the TA generates the PK certificates for parking lot owners and anonymous credentials for drivers. Firstly, The TA runs the Setup algorithm; described in Section III-B, to generate the public parameters (g 1 , g 2 , p, G 1 , G 2 , e, H). Then, it selects randomly (x, y) ∈ Z 2 p as group secret key, computes (X,Ỹ )←(g x 2 , g y 2 ), and sets the group public key as (g 2 ,X,Ỹ ).
A driver D with a valid driver license can register herself at the TA to obtain her credentials as follows. She generates a secret key by randomly selecting a 1 ∈ Z p and computes a public key A = g a1 1 . The driver randomly selects a 2 ∈ Z p , computes the pair (γ,γ)←(g a2 1 ,Ỹ a2 ) and a signature η←Sig a1 (γ). She sends to the TA (γ,γ) and η. The TA verifies the signature η by checking e(γ,Ỹ ) ? = e(g 1 ,γ). Then, the driver invokes an interactive zero knowledge proof of a 2 . After verification, the TA randomly selects k ∈ Z p to compute Figure 2 : Anonymous coin purchase.
The TA stores (ID D , γ, η,γ) in its tracking list and returns
to the driver. The driver sets her group secret key as
B. Anonymous Payment System
The anonymous payment system is realized through a trusted financial institution (FI) that converts real currency to untraceable digital coins and vice versa. Therefore, drivers have to purchase these coins from the FI, so they can make parking reservations. Note that, this step is performed outside the blockchain through an application on the driver's smart device and e-wallet service, that stores coins digitally signed by the FI. To prevent the FI from tracing a driver from the value of the purchased coins, we assume that the generated coins have the same value, which should be small to facilitate the payment (e.g., 20 cent). Then, the purchasing of coins is as follows.
• Suppose a driver D wants to purchase κ digital coins from the FI. After the payment is made (e.g., through a credit card), the driver chooses κ random secrets (serial numbers) s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s κ ∈ Z q and computes κ public
Each public key uniquely identifies one coin. Then, using partial blind signature in [21] , the driver blinds τ i using a secret value; called blind factor, to produce b e (τ i ). As shown in Fig. 3 , the packet has the real identity of the driver (ID), b e (τ i ) , timestamp (T S), and signature (σ D ). • Then, FI verifies the time stamp and the signature. After that, it uses a partial blind signature to sign b e (τ i ) along with the expiry date (ED). We assume that the coins expire every week, and it reasonable that many drivers will purchase coins each week, thus the (ED) does not reveal the identity of the driver. Then, the FI sends a packet to the driver as shown in Fig. 2 . The packet has the partial blind signature (P BS F I (be (τ i ) , ED)), timestamp (T S), and a signature (σ F I ). • Finally, once the driver receives the packet from FI, the driver should verify the timestamp and FI signature. Then, she unblinds the partially blind signature to obtain FI signature on each τ i and expiry date (ED), as follows.
Finally, a driver D can use the following tokens for the payment. Once a PO j receives these digital tokens, she can exchange the tokens for real currency, which is a process that takes place between the PO j and the FI.
C. Submitting Parking Offers
In this phase, each PO j submits its parking offers to the blockhain nodes. First, we assume the area A (e.g. a city) where the smart parking will be deployed, is divided into cells C, as shown in Fig. 3 . The cells are fixed by a predefined partition of the area (e.g., districts or neighborhoods in a city, uniform partitions in a map, etc.). Then, a PO j wishes to offer her parking spaces, it constructs a blockchain transaction that includes the following information: Number of available spaces N , cell ID C M , public key P K POj , location loc, Charging Station existence CS, bid price pr , and availability times t av .
Of f er = {N, C M , P K POj , loc, CS, pr, t av }
The offer is committed as H(of f er || Γ) for a period of time (e.g., 10 minutes) to prevent greedy PO j from increasing the parking prices during the low availability times (monopolism). Then, the transaction offer is signed with the secret key of the PO j and is broadcast on the blockchain network. Before storing the transaction on the ledger, the validators on the blockchain network will: (i) verify that the received parking offers are coming from authorized POs (ii) after the POs open their commitments by sending the Of f er and Γ, the blockchain nodes order the offers on the ledger based on the cell ID C M , as shown in Fig. 4 . This due to the use of PIR technique which will be described in section IV-D. We assume that n blockchain nodes store M sets of offers (C [1] , C [2] , . . . C [M ] ). The blockchain nodes encode each set of offers in cell C [i] as coefficients of a polynomial and evaluate these polynomials at different points α 1 , · · · , α n . Then, a blockchain node j stores the evaluation of the polynomial at α j in its block. Therefore, an encoded set of offers within a Figure 4 : Offers format stored on the blockchin nodes.
cell C [i] at n blockchain nodes can be represented as follows
Since the encoded offers C
[i] l (α j ) is evaluated at different points α j at each node, this incurs different ledger (non replicated storage) on the blockchain network, which contradicts with the consensus algorithm of the blockchain network.
To initiate a replicated storage over the blockchain nodes, we use a special case from the scheme proposed in [19] , by converting the RS[n, k] code into a linear repetition code RS[n, 1]. Thus, the encoded set of offers can be replicated on the blockchain nodes as follows.
After submitting the offers , the transactions stored on the blockchain are validated, and a secure consensus protocol should run among all participants to agree upon its global state [22] . In specific, the nodes run Raft consensus algorithm, which used in Quorum blockchain of JPMorgan Bank system [15] . Raft algorithm achieves consensus via a leader election, where a node could be either a leader or follower. The leader is responsible for offers replication to the followers, where the followers should accept and follow the block mined by the leader. Note that, the Raft algorithm provides fast conensus time and low storage overhead on the blockchain nodes.
D. Parking Offers Retrieval
In this phase, a driver D wants to retrieve the parking offers within the dth cell,
L ) from the n blockchain nodes without leaking any information (in information-theoretic sense) about the identity of the desired cell d. In this model, we protect the privacy of the offers from any group of t colluding nodes even if there exist b Byzantine databases that responds with erroneous answer strings and r unresponsive nodes.
To that end, we assume that the size of the parking offers is L = n − t − 2b − r without loss of generality. To retrieve C [d] , the driver D chooses i.i.d. and uniformly codewords from a query code C q , which is an [n, t] Reed-Solomon code. The purpose of these randomness is to hide the identity of the desired parking offers. The codewords can be represented as evaluations of a polynomial β m (z), where = 1, · · · , L, and m = 1, · · · , M . The query polynomial, Q m (z) can be written as:
Now, the driver D prepares the query to the jth blockchain node by evaluating these polynomials at z = α j , where α j ∈ F a finite field with sufficiently large alphabet (to realize the Reed-Solomon codes). Hence, the query vector to the jth node Q j is given by:
,· · · ,Q M L (α j )) (9) When the blockchain node receives the query, it uses it as a combining vector to its content, i.e., the jth blockchain node performs an inner product between Q j and the vector of content (the parking offers) Y j = (C
L ). Hence, the response of the jth node is:
(10) can be written as an evaluation of the polynomial R(z) as,
To show the decodability, we note that the degree of R(z) is n − 2b − r − 1, hence, the responses of the n databases are codewords from an [n, n − (2b + r)] Reed-Solomon code. An [n, n − (2b + r)] Reed-Solomon code is capable of correcting b errors (which result from b Byzantine nodes) and r erasures (which result from r unresponsive nodes). Therefore, with applying Reed-Solomon decoding techniques, the driver D i can decode the parking offers C [d] correctly.
To show the privacy, we note that the query code C q used to confuse the blockchain nodes is an [n, t] MDS code, hence, the distribution of any t queries is uniform and independent from d (in the same manner of Shamir's secret sharing [23] ), hence, the scheme is private.
For the retrieval rate, the driver can retrieve L symbols from n−r responsive nodes, consequently, the retrieval rate is given by: Figure 5 : Parking Reservation Phase.
E. Parking Reservation phase
In this phase, once the driver retrieve all the parking offers within a specific cell, she starts the parking reservation phase as follows.
First, the driver D generates a fresh public-secret key pair (PK D , SK D ) and sends a reservation request to the selected PO j . The parking request includes all necessary information for the PO j , such as driver temporary public key PK D , parking start time t D s , and parking period time t D p . Then, she computes
where Enc is asymmetric public key encryption algorithm e.g., Elliptic curve encryption scheme. Then, she uses the short randomizable signature scheme (described earlier in section III-B) to generate a signature on C r D as follows. D randomizes (σ 1 D , σ 2 D , σ 3 D ) by selecting r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z 2 p and computes
where a 2 is the secret used by the driver to generate the gsk D in the initialization phase. The tuble (σ 1 D , σ 2 D , c D , s) represents the driver signature on C r D , denoted as Sig D (C r D ). Then, she sends both C r D along with Sig D (C r D ) to the PO j , as shown in Fig 5. Once the PO j receives the parking request, she verifies the signature Sig D (C r D ) to ensure that the request is from a legitimate driver. The PO j computes
Then, she checks c D ?
. If it is not hold, the the PO j discards the request, otherwise she decrypts C r D and proceeds to check the availability of the selected parking. If the selected parking is available, she sends an acknowledgement ACK message to the driver, i.e., the parking space is still available and has not been reserved. Otherwise, the PO j sends N ACK message, i.e., no parking spaces are available, as shown in Fig. 5 .
Then, after the driver receives the response, she should send a reservation down payment T res D along with short randomizable signature Sig D (T res D ) to the PO j . The driver sends a number of tokens T res D ∈ T i to confirm the reservation, where T i are the tokens purchased from the FI as described earlier in Sec. IV-B.
Once the PO j receives the reservation tokens T res D , she checks the validity of the tokens, i.e., checks that: (i) the FI's signature is valid, (ii) the tokens have not been spent before. To check the double spending, the PO j sends H(T res D ) as a transaction to the blockchain nodes. Then, the validators verify the transaction validity, and check if these tokens have been spent before. If not, the hash of the tokens will be recorded on the blockcahin, and the PO j can further proceeds the parking reservation. Note that, only the hash of the token H(T res D ) is recorded on the blockchain nodes and no information about the actual value is shown to the validators.
F. Parking and Payment Phase
When the driver D arrives at the PO j , the PO j should first authenticate that the driver was the one who has made the parking reservation. First, the PO j sends a challenge message c to the driver D. Then, D uses the temporary secret key SK D corresponding to the PK D that was sent in the reservation request to generate a signature σ SK D (c) and sends it to the PO j . Then, the PO j verifies the signature. If it is valid, the PO j will allow the driver to park in her lot.
At the end of the parking phase, the payment is achieved by presenting to the PO j a series of digital tokens T i , as described in section IV-B. Note that, the tokens used as down payment in the reservation transaction will become part of the payment. Since, the tokens are a series of coins with small fixed value (e.g., 20 cents), we adopt the Schnorr's Identification Protocol scheme in [18] , so that for PO j and D, instead of verifying the validity of each token individually, he/she can verify a large number of tokens one time. Specifically, the driver D acts as a prover to verify that she knows the secret keys of the tokens, and the PO j acts as a verifier. The driver D starts the Schnorr's identification protocol as follows.
1) First, the driver D selects a random integer r ∈ Z q and sends R = r · g 1 to the PO j (commitment). 2) Then, PO j selects a uniformly random integer e ∈ Z q and sends she to the D (challenge).
3) The driver D computes
and sends PO j (response). The PO j accepts,if
After that, the PO j hashes the token and sends the H(T i ) to the blockchain network so that she can verify that the tokens have not been spent before. If not, the blockchain network records the H(T i ) on the blockchain.
G. Driver Accountability
To enable anonymity-yet-accountability we consider two types of misbehavior. 1) First, if a malicious driver makes multiple reservations without commitment to these reservations so that the PO j will have parking slots without occupancy. This can be done as follows. She can send the received signatures (σ 1 D , σ 2 D ) to the TA. For each signature (σ 1 D , σ 2 D ), the TA traces the real identity by checking
for all entries (ID D , γ, η,γ) until a match is found. 2) Second, if a malicious driver try to double spend her anonymous coins. Since the blockchain is tamper-proof, we let POs to store the hash of tokens in case of down payment and parking fees payment on the blockhain. So, if a malicious driver tried to misbehave, the PO can send the received signatures to the TA. In both cases, the PO can send the received signature to the TA, which can revoke the malicious driver from the system.
V. EVALUATIONS A. Communication and Computation Overhead
To evaluate communication and computation overheads of our scheme, we implemented the required cryptographic operations using Python charm cryptographic library [24] running on Raspberry Pi 3 devices with 1.2 GHz Processor and 1 GB RAM. We used supersingular elliptic curve with the asymmetric Type 3 pairing of size 160 bits (MNT159 curve) for bilinear pairing, and SHA − 2 hash function. Note that, we used Elliptic curve encryption scheme since it requires significantly smaller key size comparing to RSA encryption with same level of security. Thus, it achieves faster computation and lower communication overhead.
1) Communication Overhead: The communication overhead is measured by the size of transmitted messages in bytes between a driver and the blockchain nodes (Parking lot Retrieval phase), a driver and a parking lot owner (Reservation phase), a driver and the FI (anonymous payment system).
For the communication overhead in the retrieval phase is given in [19] where the the size of the retrieval data is calculated using the Eq. 23
where the Retrieval Rate is given by Eq. 24
Where n is the number of blockchain , t colluding nodes, b byzantine nodes, r unresponsive nodes. Note that, the upload cost for the queries that sent by the driver to blockchain nodes to retrieve parking offers is ignored according to [19] .
For the simulation, we considered t = b = r = 1, also for each parking offer by PO i contains the number of available parking slots N (2 byte), cell number C M (2 byte), a public key P K POj (20 byte) according to elliptic encryption scheme [25] , location coordinates loc (6 byte), a charging station existence index CS (1 byte), a bid price pr (1 byte), a time availability t av (8 byte). So, the total size of a parking offer is 40 bytes. Fig. 6 gives the retrieval data overhead at the driver side with 10 blockchain nodes. In Fig. 6 , as the number of parking lot owners i.e., parking offers increase with in a cell, the Retrieval data increases. However, the retrieval data is acceptable where it is less than 5 k bytes when the number of parking offers is 50. Also, Fig. 7 gives the retrieval data overhead at the driver side with changing the number of blockchain nodes n. As per Fig. 7 , as the number of blockchain nodes increases, the size of the downloaded data decreases. Note that, as the number of blockchain nodes increases, the size of the downloaded data decreases. This is due to the effect of Byzantine node is reduced, where we considered that we have a fixed number of Byzantine blockchain nodes (b = 1).
In the parking reservation phase, the driver reservation request contains: a ciphertext C r D , and a signature 2) Computation overhead: The computation overhead is measured by the time of cryptographic operations in parking reservation phases and anonymous payment. The cryptographic operations used in our scheme is given in Table. II.
In the parking reservation phase, the driver has to compute 1 Enc which requires 2 Mul, 1 Add, in addition to a short randomizable signature 3 Exp, 1 Mul, 1 Add, 1 Hash to generate a parking reservation request. Therefore, the overall computation overhead equal to 3 × 0.333714 + 3 × 0.000269 + 2 × 0.000227 + 1 × 0.000227 = 1.003 ms
In the anonymous payment phase, the computation overhead for a driver to purchase one coin is 0.394 ms, where it needs 0.06 ms for FI to sign each coin. After the parking, the driver transmits the coins to the parking owner PO j . It needs a 0.059 ms to verify FI's coin signature. In the Schnorr's batch identification protocol, it takes the driver 0.084 ms to prove the ownership large number of coins. On the other side, it needs 0.855 ms for the PO j to verify the received coins.
B. Security/Privacy Analysis
In this section, we investigate the security/privacy preservation features provided by our scheme. 1) Decentralized smart parking System. Parking lot owners can offer their parking spaces without reliance on a trusted third party. Blockchain network is responsible for managing parking offers among interested distrusted parking lot owners that makes the system robust and scalable. Unlike centralized approaches, attackers need to control an infeasible number of blockchain nodes to reach a system failure state. 2) Privacy-preserving parking activities. The privacy of drivers (their parking locations) is protected from blockchain nodes by using the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) technique. Also, in the reservation step, no parking information is stored on the blockchain. Moreover, the drivers' privacy is protected by replacing their real identities by using temporary Public-Secret key pairs for parking lot retrieval. Each key pair expires once the driver sends a parking lot retrieval request to the blockchain which ensures unlinkabilty. In the parking reservation request phase, the drivers real identities are replaced by anonymous credentials. 3) Drivers' unlinkabilty. Given different parking reservation requests from one driver at different times, the parking lot owner cannot learn if these requests are sent from the same driver or not. This is due to the use of short randomizable signature to generate anonymous credentials. In other words, a driver can use different random numbers r 1 while randomizing the signature (σ 1 D , σ 2 D ) on different reservation requests. Also, using partial blind signature to obtain digital tokens T i , no entity can link a token to a certain driver in the payment phase. 4) Preventing Monpolism. By using the commitment scheme, greedy parking lot owners cannot increase their prices during the times of low availability. This is because the hiding and binding properties in the commitment scheme. Once a parking lot owner commits an offer while keeping it hidden to the blockchain network (hiding), with ability to reveal the committed offer later without any changes (binding), no parking lot owner can have information about others offers (hidden offers). 5) Drivers' Authentication. The anonymous credentials security is based on the unforgeability of the short randomizable signature (σ 1 , σ 2 ), which is proved under LRSW assumption 1 in [13] . 6) Driver Accountability. The TA is able to trace the real identity of a malicious driver from the signature (σ 1 , σ 2 ) and its tracking list (ID, τ, η,τ ). It checks e(σ 2 , g 2 ) · e(σ 1 ,Ã) = e(σ 1 ,τ ) for all the entries (ID, τ, η,τ ). Moreover, only the TA can recover the drivers' identities from their signatures, becauseτ is only known to the TA besides the identity owner.
VI. RELATED WORK
Different works have been proposed in privacy-preserving smart parking systems. Huang et. al. [6] proposed a privacypreserving reservation scheme for AVs. They used anonymity to hide users' identities as well as geo-indistinguishablity mechanism is used to enhance users' location privacy where a noise is utilized to obfuscate the original location. However, this location obfuscation technique is a trade off between privacy and accuracy. Moreover, the paper mainly focused on identity privacy and preventing double reservation attack. Zhu et. al. [7] , introduced anonymous smart parking and payment system. The author employs anonymity and cloaking technique to preserve the privacy of both the drivers and the private parking slot owners. Ni et. al. [8] presented smart parking navigation where users are guided by a cloud server and Ride Side Units (RSUs) to available parking lots in their destination without disclosing their real identities. The scheme mainly preservers users' privacy by using antonymous credentials. However, the users declare private information such as, current locations , destinations, and arrival times to the cloud server. This enables malicious cloud server to track users easily even the anonymity is provided. In [26] , a Cloud-based Privacy-preserving Parking Navigation system (CPRAN) is proposed in to provide anonymous parking services. The drivers reach the unoccupied parking slots which close to their destination by the cloud server's guidance. In [1] , a privacypreserving intelligent parking system for large parking lots, where the scheme is based on vehicular communication with the RSUs to assist vehicles to find available parking spaces. The scheme privacy relies on pseudonyms and provides anti theft protection. In [27] , a privacy-preserving smart parking platform is proposed. The paltform provides secure communication for users by using Zero Knowledge Proof protocol to hide sensitive user information while providing authentication. Also, the paltform employs Elliptic Curve Cryptography to reduce the computation overhead.
Different from existing schemes, we leverage blockchain in this work to provide decentralized parking management services where there is no central entity controls the service which can misbehave and revoke access from particular users. In addition, our scheme guarantees availability where there is no single point of failure since it is managed by many peers.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a distributed privacy-preserving parking management system. The scheme is based on consortium blockchain which avoids the bottle neck of the single point of failure due to denial of service attacks. The scheme takes the advantage of decentralization of blockchain, which provides security, transparency, and availability. To prevent monpolism by greedy parking lot owners, we used commitment scheme while submitting the parking offers. Furthermore, we utilized Private Information Retrieval (PIR) technique to preserve the drivers desired destination during parking offers queries. In addition, we used short randomizable signature for anonymous authentication. Moreover, anonymous payment is used to preventing link a driver with a certain parking location.
